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I. INTRODUCTION 
In June of 2017, representatives from roughly seventy tax jurisdictions 
from around the world signed the Multilateral Convention to Implement 
Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(The “Multilateral Instrument” or “MLI.”).1 To date, a total of seventy-
eight countries have signed the MLI.2 The MLI is one of the more recent 
outgrowths of the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) 
                                                          
* J.D./L.L.M. in Taxation, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2019; B.A., Cedarville 
University, 2016. I am grateful to the editors and staff of the Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business for catching my errors and otherwise improving this article. 
I am also indebted to Professor David Cameron and my mom and dad for their help and 
encouragement in writing this article. 
 1 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS, 
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-
related-measures-to-prevent-beps.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2017). 
 2 Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty 
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD (last visited Jan. 24, 
2018), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf. 
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Project that was announced in 2012.3 The general purpose of the BEPS 
Project was to reduce BEPS, which the OECD defines as “tax avoidance 
strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift 
profits to low or no-tax locations.”4 In essence, the BEPS Project seeks to 
eliminate instances of what is often referred to as “double non-taxation”: 
circumstances in which income is connected with two (or potentially more) 
jurisdictions, neither of which impose a tax on it.5 
The MLI is intended to advance several of the “action steps” that the 
OECD has identified as necessary to address what the OECD identifies as 
the increasing problem of BEPS.6 It does this by modifying existing 
bilateral tax treaties between tax jurisdictions. Where two jurisdictions that 
have signed a tax treaty have also signed the MLI both indicate that they 
desire the MLI to apply to that same treaty, that treaty becomes a “covered 
tax agreement.” Covered tax agreements are then subject to at least some of 
the provisions of the MLI that intend to reduce BEPS based on which 
provisions the jurisdictions have each adopted.7 
Therein lies one of the deficiencies of the MLI. The MLI does contain 
language that addresses some of the OECD’s concerns about BEPS. In that 
way, it may very well signal an international desire to challenge BEPS in a 
more cooperative fashion than before.8 However, the MLI ultimately does 
not require jurisdictions to commit to eliminating double non-taxation 
scenarios, nor does it provide a mandatory enforcement mechanism for 
ensuring double non-taxation is eliminated without producing double-
taxation.9 In fact, very little of the MLI is mandatory, and it is worth 
considering the reality that many of the signees have not adopted some of 
the most impactful provisions of the MLI. Thus, the MLI largely continues 
to rely on the voluntary actions of the nations involved in it to address and 
eliminate double non-taxation scenarios. As voluntary resolution of double 
                                                          
 3 See OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD PUBLISHING 
(2013), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf (hereinafter Action Plan). 
 4 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2017). 
 5 Action Plan, supra note 3, at 10. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Frequently Asked Questions on the Multilateral Instrument (MLI), OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/MLI-frequently-asked-questions.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 
2017). 
 8 See Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137, 1176-
1177 (2016). 
 9 See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax 
Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD (June 7 2017), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-
measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf.; see also OECD: Countries sign multilateral instrument, 
implementing BEPS in tax treaties, KPMG (June 7, 2017), https://home.kpmg.com/
xx/en/home/insights/2017/06/tnf-oecd-countries-sign-multilateral-instrument-implementing-
beps-in-tax-treaties.html. 
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non-taxation scenarios may conflict with the policies of many developing 
tax jurisdictions as well as those that generate the highest tax revenue, the 
MLI is unlikely to significantly reduce BEPS by itself. Because it relies on 
voluntary cooperation between tax jurisdictions on addressing BEPS, the 
MLI will generally be ineffective at reducing BEPS. 
The first part of this paper will examine the objectives of the BEPS 
Project and outputs of the BEPS Project intended to achieve those 
objectives, including the BEPS Action Plan of 2013. The second part will 
examine the MLI itself and what exactly the document requires of its 
signees. The third part of this paper will examine the limits of the MLI 
itself. Finally, the fourth part of this paper will examine some of the main 
reasons why countries are likely to resist taking decisive action against 
BEPS and discusses some possible actions that may be more effective at 
advancing BEPS Project objectives. 
II. THE BEPS PROJECT 
The MLI is one of the latest outputs of the OECD’s BEPS Project. 
Simply put, the stated objective of the OECD’s BEPS Project is to reduce 
BEPS. However, the OECD has generally avoided putting too fine of a 
point on what exactly BEPS is.10 As described earlier, the OECD defines 
BEPS broadly as strategies for avoiding taxation that “exploit gaps and 
mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax 
jurisdictions.”11 This broad definition is likely in part because the OECD 
intends BEPS to encapsulate a broad range of tax avoidance maneuvers, 
including, but not limited to, shifting income between jurisdictions using 
transfer pricing and shifting income between jurisdictions through the use 
of legal entities that serve little function beyond shifting the income.12 The 
OECD identifies a main concern of the BEPS Project to be double non-
taxation scenarios.13 
The OECD provides an example of one particular form of BEPS to 
illustrate the behavior. Suppose a business is organized as a corporation in 
Country A. It may have a wholly-owned subsidiary in Country B. The 
corporation in Country A owns intellectual property that it wants to license 
to the corporation in Country B. However, both Country A and Country B 
                                                          
 10 See Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 4; see also Action Plan, supra note 
3, at 7-11. 
 11 Action Plan, supra note 3, at 10. 
 12 See Robert G. Rinninsland & Kenneth Lobo, US-Based Pushback on BEPS, 43 
INTERTAX 96, 10-11 (2015); see also OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 
OECD PUBLISHING (2013) at 10, http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/
taxation/addressing-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en#.WfuOEDFe6Uk#
page3. 
 13 See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD PUBLISHING (2013) 
at 10, http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/addressing-base-
erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en#.WfuOEDFe6Uk#page3. 
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have relatively high marginal tax rates on the income that would be 
generated to the parent from licensing this intellectual property. 
Accordingly, the business incorporates a third entity in Country C, which 
has very low taxes on this type of income. This third entity then holds the 
IP, the income from which may largely be taxable in Country C instead of 
Country A and B, even though the parties have no other presence in 
Country C. 
Although BEPS has existed for decades, the OECD’s efforts to reduce 
it are relatively recent. The OECD cites the League of Nations as 
identifying problems with double-taxation scenarios in the international 
context in the 1920s.14 Indeed, the OECD identifies President John F. 
Kennedy as observing the phenomenon of businesses minimizing their tax 
liability through “artificial arrangements” among related entities in 1961.15 
However, little was historically done to prevent BEPS.16 
A number of more recent developments motivated the international 
community to take action to prevent BEPS. As businesses have continued 
to become more global in scope and reach, BEPS is believed to have 
become more prevalent.17 Additionally, developments in computer and 
telecommunications technology in recent decades have made it easier for 
business enterprises to engage in activities that may affect the tax 
jurisdiction in which they report income without substantively changing 
where business activities take place.18 Indeed, these technological 
developments have made it easier for many enterprises to do business 
within a tax jurisdiction without being subject to tax under traditional 
income tax rules, even without special tax planning.19 Such technologies 
have also increased the degree to which income is dependent on intangible 
assets, and not on tangible fixed assets such as factories.20 Additionally, the 
decline in government income tax revenues caused by the decline in income 
during the great recession motivated many tax jurisdictions to look for 
politically expedient methods of collecting additional tax revenue.21 BEPS 
became a politically expedient target for increasing tax revenues, at least in 
part, as a result of the media’s concentration on the issue.22 
In 2012, the BEPS Project officially began when the G20 identified 
BEPS as an issue that it wanted to address.23 The task of actually addressing 
                                                          
 14 Id. at 9. 
 15 What the BEPS are we Talking About?, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/what-the-
beps-are-we-talking-about.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2017). 
 16 Action Plan, supra note 3, at 9. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 10. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 58 (2014). 
 22 Id. at 55-57. 
 23 Grinberg, supra note 8, at 1142. 
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BEPS fell to the OECD, the de facto organization for governing 
international tax matters.24 In 2013, the OECD published Addressing Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, a report describing the impact of BEPS, how 
BEPS occurs, and key areas that the OECD believed needed to be 
addressed in order to reduce BEPS.25 After justifying its efforts to reduce 
BEPS, the report identified six “key pressure areas” that needed to be 
addressed in order to reduce the prevalence of BEPS: (1) jurisdictional 
differences in the treatment of entities and instruments, (2) the application 
of ideas from treaties to digital goods and services, (3) tax treatment of 
financial transactions between related parties, (4) transfer pricing, (5) treaty 
provisions intended to thwart efforts to use other treaty provisions to avoid 
tax (anti-avoidance measures), and (6) the presence of tax jurisdictions that 
tax income at a lower rate than other jurisdictions..2627 
Also in 2013, the OECD released the Action Plan on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting.28 This report set out fifteen actions that the OECD assessed 
needed to be undertaken in order to address BEPS globally, and helped 
clarify what the OECD identifies as issues that the BEPS Project seeks to 
resolve.29 The OECD believes that in order to reduce BEPS, these actions 
must be taken by “consensus.”30 The first action is to address various 
difficulties relating to imposing taxes in a digital economy.31 These 
difficulties include those brought about by the ability of businesses to sell 
their products in a tax jurisdiction without having a presence in that 
jurisdiction that would subject it to taxation under traditional rules.32 
Actions two through five generally strive to advance “international 
coherence of corporate income taxation.”33 These actions generally address 
concerns that tax laws of various jurisdictions are “mismatched” and 
provide opportunities for double non-taxation.34 The actions specifically 
target “hybrid mismatch agreements” (arrangements whereby businesses 
can deduct the same expense in multiple tax jurisdictions, generate a 
deduction without an inclusion in income, and other similar maneuvers) by 
generating model treaty provisions that address these concerns as well as 
developing domestic tax law recommendations to preclude these types of 
tax positions.35 
                                                          
 24 See id. 
 25 Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 12. 
 26 Id. at 47-48. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Action Plan, supra note 3. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 10-11. 
 31 Id. at 14-15. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 15-18. 
 34 Action Plan, supra note 3, at 15-18. 
 35 Id. 
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Actions six through ten focus on changing both international and 
domestic tax laws so that income is generally taxed where “the economic 
activity that generates that income” occurs.36 Specifically, these actions 
desire to create model treaty provisions and domestic law recommendations 
that prevent entities from obtaining benefits from tax treaties in 
“inappropriate circumstances,”37 changing treaty definitions of permanent 
establishments (PEs) to make it more difficult to avoid PE status,38 and 
developing rules that help ensure that transfer pricing aligns with “value 
creation.”39 These actions target what the OECD considers to be artificial 
shifting of income between tax jurisdictions. 
Actions eleven through fourteen focus on making taxpayer 
information more available to taxing authorities.40 These actions include 
setting up methodologies for gathering and analyzing data and information 
on BEPS, changing the types and generally increasing the amount of 
information taxpayers are required to disclose to taxing authorities, such as 
aggressive tax-planning maneuvers, and ensuring that disputes between 
taxing jurisdictions are conclusively resolved.41 Finally, action fifteen 
endorses the development of a multilateral instrument to allow for the rapid 
implementation of the OECD’s BEPS measures by incorporating them into 
existing tax treaties.42 These standards focus on ensuring that tax 
jurisdictions are able to apply and enforce rules and recommendations to 
reduce BEPS.43 
Based on these actions (particularly actions 10-14), the OECD 
released the Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting action 13 Final Report in 2015.44 This report emphasized that 
giving tax authorities access to detailed information on businesses’ global 
operations would help them more accurately assess the validity of transfer 
pricing positions.45 The next year, the OECD made country-by-country 
reporting a minimum standard requirement, effective for tax periods 
beginning on or after January 1, 2016.46 Under the OECD requirements, 
businesses meeting certain size thresholds must provide the taxing 
authorities of countries in which they operate with certain information 
                                                          
 36 Id. at 18-21. 
 37 Id. at 19. 
 38 Id. at 19-20. 
 39 Id. at 20-21. 
 40 Action Plan, supra note 3, at 21-23. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 23-24. 
 43 Id. at 21-24. 
 44 Country-By-Country Reporting: Some Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), OFFICE 
OF REVENUE COMMISSIONERS (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.revenue.ie/en/companies-and-
charities/documents/country-by-country-reporting.pdf. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
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about the company (including the company’s global revenues, profits, and 
taxes), broken down by tax jurisdiction.47 This requirement will facilitate 
assessing the appropriateness and global consistency of tax positions taken 
by global businesses. 
The BEPS Project is fundamentally motivated by the belief that 
existing tax laws provide too many opportunities for businesses operating 
internationally to avoid tax by moving profits between tax jurisdictions 
without substantively changing or moving their operations. The OECD 
believes that recent developments in computer and communications 
technology and the increasingly international scope of business mean that a 
larger amount of income goes either untaxed or taxed at relatively low 
rates.48 To reduce BEPS in order to increase tax revenues, the OECD has 
laid out a number of actions that it intends to take. These essentially fall 
into two categories: developing recommendations for tax jurisdictions’ 
domestic tax law, and developing model treaty provisions or parts of a 
multilateral instrument that will address BEPS concerns. The OECD sees 
these as the main methods it can use to address BEPS. 
III. THE MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT (THE “MLI”) 
In November of 2016, the OECD released the language of the MLI, 
with the intent that countries would begin signing it the following 
summer.49 The MLI that the OECD ended up drafting seeks to address 
several of the actions it identified as being key steps to reduce BEPS.50 
Specifically, the MLI includes provisions that intend to advance Action 
Two (“Neutralise the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Agreements”), Action 
Six (“Prevent Treaty Abuse”), Action Seven (“Prevent the Artificial 
Avoidance of PE Status”), Action Fourteen (“Make Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms More Effective”), and of course, Action Fifteen (“Develop a 
Multilateral Instrument”).51 
The MLI works by modifying existing bilateral tax treaties, that is, 
treaties that are exclusively between two tax jurisdictions.52 Tax 
                                                          
 47 Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Country-by-Country Reporting: Handbook on 
Effective Implementation, (Sep. 2017), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps/country-by-country-
reporting-handbook-on-effective-implementation.pdf. 
 48 Joint Comm. on Taxation, Background, Summary, and Implications of the 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, (Nov. 30, 2015). 
 49 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS, 
supra note 1. 
 50 See Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty 
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 1-7, OECD, 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/explanatory-statement-multilateral-convention-to-
implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
 51 See KPMG, supra note 9. 
 52 See Frequently Asked Questions on the Multilateral Instrument (MLI), supra note 7, 
at 3. 
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jurisdictions that sign the MLI indicate that they desire the provisions of the 
MLI to apply to at least some of the tax treaties they have signed.53 
However, signing tax jurisdictions need not apply the provisions of the MLI 
to all of their tax treaties. Furthermore, the MLI only applies to tax treaties 
signed by two parties that have both indicated their desire to have the MLI 
cover that tax treaty.54 In the MLI’s language, treaties that both parties want 
covered are referred to as “covered tax agreements,” or CTAs.55 Of the over 
3,000 bilateral tax treaties currently in force, roughly 1,100 would become 
CTAs if the signing tax jurisdictions ratify the MLI in accordance with their 
currently-filed lists of reservations and notifications at the time of their 
signing.56 
Each of the substantive provisions of the MLI includes at least one 
clause implementing a measure to reduce BEPS.57 This language is 
essentially equivalent to the language developed by the OECD for its 
Model Tax Convention,58 which is undergoing significant alteration to 
reflect the BEPS Project.59 These provisions are found in parts II through 
VI.60 Generally speaking, Part II of the MLI seeks to limit the effects of 
certain types of “hybrid mismatch agreements” by limiting the degree to 
which entities can obtain tax relief from both contracting jurisdictions 
simultaneously.61 Part III seeks to limit “treaty abuse” by restricting the 
circumstances in which taxpayers can receive certain treaty benefits.62 Part 
IV includes provisions to limit the ability of PEs to avoid PE status through 
what the OECD sees as artificial behavior.63 Part V features numerous 
provisions to facilitate the resolution of tax disputes under a CTA.64 Finally, 
Part VI provides for binding arbitration when the contracting jurisdictions 
cannot reach an agreement on the CTA tax issues presented.65 
More specifically, Part II of the MLI deals specifically with Action 
                                                          
 53 See id. 
 54 See id. at 4. 
 55 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 2(1)(a). 
 56 See KPMG, supra note 9. 
 57 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, A Global Tax Override? The New OECD 
Multilateral Tax Instrument and Its Limits, (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Research, Paper No. 
542, Mar. 17, 2017), at Part 2.4. 
 58 See id. 
 59 OECD, DRAFT CONTENTS OF THE 2017 UPDATE TO THE OECD MODEL TAX 
CONVENTION 2 (Jul. 11, 2017). 
 60 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9. 
 61 Id. at Art. 3 – Art. 5. 
 62 Id. at Art. 6 – Art. 11. 
 63 Id. at Art. 12 – Art. 15. 
 64 Id. at Art. 16 – Art. 17. 
 65 Id. at Art. 18 – Art. 26. 
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Two and thus seeks to neutralize the effect of hybrid mismatches.66 Article 
3 deals specifically with “transparent entities,” 67 or entities whose income 
is taxed to the owner rather than the entity itself.68 This provision requires 
signing jurisdictions to treat the income of transparent entities as income of 
a resident to the extent that the jurisdiction treats such a transaction as 
income.69 This provision also prohibits the contracting jurisdictions from 
providing tax exemptions, credits, or deductions for taxes paid by their 
residents on income that the other jurisdiction may tax, if the only basis for 
the other jurisdiction’s right to tax the income is that the taxpayer is a 
resident of the other jurisdiction.70 In other words, Country A is not 
permitted to give tax relief to Resident 1 on income that Country B can tax 
if the sole reason Country B can tax that income is that Country B views 
that income as income of a resident of Country B. Under this provision, the 
mere fact that an entity is a resident of one contracting jurisdiction does not 
itself eliminate the other jurisdiction’s ability to tax its income. Thus, where 
applied, this provision makes it more difficult for taxpayers to avoid taxes 
in one jurisdiction by using a transparent entity to conduct business in that 
jurisdiction. 
Article 4 of the MLI addresses how contracting jurisdictions will 
resolve situations in which a non-individual taxpayer appears to be a citizen 
of both of the signing jurisdictions.71 It provides that if the taxing 
jurisdictions both identify a taxpayer as a resident of their jurisdiction for 
tax purposes, “the competent authorities” of the two jurisdictions will 
“endeavor to determine by mutual agreement” which jurisdiction will be the 
taxpayer’s tax residence.72 This is to be determined based on the taxpayer’s 
place of effective management, place of incorporation or organization, and 
“any other relevant factors.”73 In essence, Article 4 establishes a 
commitment of the signing jurisdictions to try to agree on which 
jurisdiction is the residence of a non-individual taxpayer. 
Article 5 offers three potential options for signing tax jurisdictions to 
apply in order to eliminate double taxation.74 Option A requires CTA 
provisions that (in order to prevent double taxation) exempt income or 
                                                          
 66 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 3 – Art. 5. 
 67 Id. at Art. 3. 
 68 See Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at 14. 
 69 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 3(1). 
 70 Id. at Art. 3(2); Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at 14. 
 71 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 4(1). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at Art. 5(1). Although Article 4 is labeled as providing options for eliminating 
double taxation, Options A and B appear to only target double non-taxation. 
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capital of a signing jurisdiction resident to not apply in cases where the 
other tax jurisdiction exempts the same income or capital (or tax it at a 
lower rate than it otherwise would) using the CTA provision.75 However, 
the first jurisdiction must allow a deduction for taxes paid in the second 
jurisdiction under this scenario.76 In other words, both tax jurisdictions 
cannot exempt from taxation or apply a reduced tax rate on the same tax 
base using the same CTA agreement. 
Option B requires CTA provisions that exempt income of a resident 
from taxation as dividend income to not apply where that income creates a 
deduction in the other tax jurisdiction.77 As in Option A, the first 
jurisdiction must still provide a deduction for taxes paid in the other 
jurisdiction.78 Under Option C, where a resident of one of the signing 
jurisdictions derives income or owns capital which may be taxed in the 
other jurisdiction, the first jurisdiction must allow a deduction for those 
taxes paid to the other jurisdiction.79 Furthermore, where a provision of the 
CTA exempts income or property of a resident from tax in its jurisdiction of 
residence, that jurisdiction may still consider that exempt income or capital 
in determining the tax on the taxpayer’s remaining income or capital.80 
Each of these three options seeks to minimize the opportunities for 
taxpayers to avoid tax in two jurisdictions simultaneously. 
Part III of the MLI focuses on Action Six of the BEPS Project and thus 
seeks to address a number of concerns regarding “Treaty Abuse.”81 Article 
6 mandates a preamble to CTAs that expresses a desire to eliminate double 
taxation without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation, 
and provides optional language expressing a desire to develop the economic 
relationship between the two signing jurisdictions.82 Article 7 is the longest 
provision of the MLI, and it deals with numerous issues pertaining Action 
Six. First, it applies what is often referred to as the “principal purpose test” 
to CTAs.83 This means that a taxpayer will not receive the benefits of a 
CTA in a particular instance if it is reasonable to conclude that one of the 
principal purposes of the arrangement or transaction that resulted in a 
benefit is to obtain the CTA benefit.84 However, there are two exceptions to 
this. The first permits the taxpayer to receive the CTA benefit when doing 
                                                          
 75 Id. at Art. 5(2)-5(3). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 5(4)-5(5). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at Art. 5(6)-5(7). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at Art. 6 – Art. 11. 
 82 Id. at Art. 6(1)-6(3). 
 83 Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at Part 2.7.2. 
 84 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 7(1). 
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so comports with the purpose of the applicable provision of the CTA.85 The 
other exception permits the taxpayer to receive the benefit when the 
taxpayer would have received the CTA benefit even if it had not engaged in 
the pertinent behavior in order to obtain the treaty benefit.86 
Article 7 also provides what the MLI refers to as the “Simplified 
Limitation on Benefits Provision”87 Under this rule, most of the benefits 
provided by the CTA are only available to residents of one of the signing 
jurisdictions that are “qualified person[s].”88 The exceptions to this are: (1) 
CTA provisions that determine residency of taxpayers other than 
individuals who are residents of more than one contracting jurisdiction 
under the CTA rules; (2) CTA provisions allowing for tax adjustments in 
one contracting jurisdiction corresponding to tax adjustments made by the 
other contracting jurisdiction; and (3) CTA provisions that allow residents 
of the contracting jurisdictions to request that the competent authority of the 
contracting jurisdiction consider a tax case.89 “Qualified person[s]” include 
individuals, government entities of either contracting jurisdiction, publicly 
traded entities, certain non-profit entities, government employee benefit 
related-entities, and entities owned at least 50% by “qualified person[s]” for 
at least half of the days of a twelve-month period including the time when 
the benefit would be accorded.90 
Additionally, residents of the contracting jurisdictions can receive 
treaty benefits if they are “engaged in the active conduct of a business” in 
their jurisdiction of residence and they generate income in the other 
jurisdiction as a result of that business.91 In such cases, they are entitled to 
CTA benefits for income that has arisen in the other jurisdiction from their 
business activity or that of a connected person in the other jurisdiction if 
that business activity is substantially related to, or complementary to, 
business conducted in the other jurisdiction.92 Finally, a resident of a 
contracting jurisdiction can receive a CTA benefit if that resident is owned 
at least 75% by persons who are entitled to those tax benefits or more 
favorable ones for at least half of the days of a twelve-month period, 
including the time when the benefit would be accorded.93 These provisions 
make it more difficult for non-residents to benefit from tax treaty provisions 
in jurisdictions in which they are not residents, potentially eliminating 
                                                          
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at Art. 7(4). 
 87 Id. at Art. 7(6). 
 88 Id. at Art. 7(8). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at Art. 7(9). 
 91 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 7(10). 
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many tax-planning opportunities. 
Article 8 of the MLI limits the degree to which internationally paid 
dividends that are exempt from tax are also deductible under a CTA.94 
Specifically, under Article 8, CTA provisions that reduce or eliminate tax 
on dividends from a company in one contracting jurisdiction to an owner in 
the other contracting jurisdiction only apply if the owner has had the 
requisite ownership interest for a 365-day period.95 This theoretically 
reduces opportunities for businesses to receive treaty benefits on dividends 
received from stock held for only a short amount of time. 
Article 9 of the MLI makes it more difficult to avoid capital gain 
taxation under CTAs by contributing real property to a business entity 
shortly before selling an interest in the entity.96 Article 9 allows for the 
taxing of gains a resident of one contracting jurisdiction recognizes on the 
sale of an interest in an entity by the other contracting jurisdiction in certain 
circumstances.97 These circumstances are met if, at any point during the 365 
days preceding the sale, more than a certain portion of the property owned 
by the entity in which the interest is being sold derives from real property 
located in the jurisdiction of which the taxpayer is not a resident.98 Article 9 
also allows a contracting jurisdiction to tax the gains that an entity in the 
other contracting jurisdiction recognizes on the alienation of an interest in 
another entity, if those interests derived more than 50% of their value from 
real property in the first contracting jurisdiction at any time during the prior 
365 days.99 These provisions would make it difficult for entities selling 
interests in enterprises holding large amounts of real property to avoid 
taxation by contributing the real property shortly before selling the interest. 
Article 10 addresses the OECD’s concerns that taxpayers use PEs in 
third jurisdictions to avoid taxation in both of the parties to a bilateral tax 
treaty.100 This provision envisions a scenario in which a business located in 
Jurisdiction A generates income in Jurisdiction B, but Jurisdiction A treats 
the income as attributable to a PE in Jurisdiction C, and thus does not tax 
the income.101 In such cases, the MLI denies the benefits of an applicable 
CTA to any such item of income on which Jurisdiction C’s tax is less than 
60% of the tax Jurisdiction A would have imposed had the PE been in 
Jurisdiction A.102 Furthermore, that income will be taxable to Jurisdiction B 
                                                          
 94 Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at Part 2.7.3. 
 95 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
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under its domestic law.103 
There are two exceptions to this. The first is when the income 
attributed to the PE in Jurisdiction C is related to the active conduct of a 
business done by the PE.104 The second is when the pertinent tax authority 
in Jurisdiction B in the above example (after consulting with Jurisdiction 
A’s tax authority) determines that granting the benefits of the CTA is 
justified due to the reason the taxpayer failed to meet the test above.105 This 
provision of the MLI theoretically limits the ability of businesses to use 
inactive PEs to shift income out of high tax jurisdictions into low or no-tax 
jurisdictions. 
As the last article of Part III of the MLI, Article 11 limits the 
restrictions that CTAs place on contracting jurisdiction’s ability to tax their 
own residents, thus preserving the ability of tax jurisdictions to tax their 
own residents.106 It does this by stating that a CTA does not affect the 
ability of a contracting jurisdiction to tax its residents except in ten 
enumerated areas.107 This article thus strives to provide fewer opportunities 
under tax treaties for entities to avoid paying taxes to their jurisdiction of 
residence. 
Part IV of the MLI focuses on Action Seven of the BEPS Project and 
thus strives to make it more difficult for entities to artificially avoid PE 
status.108 Article 12 of the MLI makes it more difficult for entities to avoid 
PE status. The article provides that a business will have a PE in a 
contracting jurisdiction where a person acts on behalf of the business and 
habitually concludes or principally negotiates contracts in the business’s 
name for the transfer property rights owned by the business or that commit 
the business to providing services.109 There is an exception to this rule 
where the business conducts these activities through a fixed place of 
business and the activities would be insufficient to make that fixed place of 
business a PE under the CTA.110 There is also an exception where the 
person concluding or negotiating contracts does so as an independent agent 
under the terms of the treaty in the ordinary course of business.111 Thus, this 
                                                          
 103 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9; Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at Part 2.7.5. 
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article, in spite of the exceptions, seeks to limit the ability of international 
business enterprises to have agents operating in foreign tax jurisdictions 
without creating a PE. 
Article 13 of the MLI provides two options for contracting 
jurisdictions to limit the ability of business enterprises to avoid PE status 
determined by their activities.112 Option A establishes that only certain 
enumerated activities, including those included in a CTA as well as the 
maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any activity included in 
the CTA, are permitted without causing a PE.113 A combination of exempt 
activities must be limited to those “of a preparatory or auxiliary 
character.”114 Option B includes much of the same language as Option A 
but provides a few additional restrictions on activity that does not constitute 
PE status.115 Additionally, Option B provides that a fixed place of business 
will be accorded PE status where the business operating that fixed place or 
a related business carries on other business activities in the same tax 
jurisdiction as the fixed place of business that constitutes a PE, or makes the 
overall level of activity in the jurisdiction not of “a preparatory or auxiliary 
character.”116 Under this additional rule, PE status only applies where the 
business activities of the enterprise in the jurisdiction are “complementary 
functions that are part of a cohesive business operation.”117 This seeks to 
limit businesses’ abilities to avoid PE status by conducting business 
activities discretely within a given tax jurisdiction. 
Article 14 of the MLI limits the ability of international businesses to 
avoid PE status by temporally separating certain activities in a tax 
jurisdiction.118 Article 14 envisions a scenario in which a business from 
Contracting Jurisdiction A conducts activities in connection with a building 
site or other location listed in the CTA or the MLI in Contracting 
Jurisdiction B.119 In such cases, 
 if the activities take place over more than an aggregate of thirty 
days, or 
 if the activities are for a period of time exceeding thirty days if 
done by businesses “closely related to the first-mentioned” 
business, 120 
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these activities will be added to the aggregate period of time that the “first 
mentioned” business carried activities at that location.121 In essence, this 
provision of the MLI forces businesses to include short periods of time, or 
somewhat longer periods of time in the case of related businesses, in their 
aggregate amount of time working at a location in another tax jurisdiction. 
This makes it harder for businesses to avoid PE status by doing work in 
other countries through separate entities or by engaging in activities in other 
countries for short, discrete periods at a time.122 
Part V of the MLI focuses on Action Fourteen of the BEPS Project: 
more effective dispute resolution mechanisms.123 The first article of this 
part, Article 16, establishes some of the procedures for determining how the 
contracting jurisdictions resolve tax disputes that arise under the MLI.124 
Under this article, referred to as the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP), a 
person who “considers” the actions of at least one of the contracting 
jurisdictions to tax that person in violation of the CTA may present its case 
to either jurisdiction’s tax authority.125 This must be done within three years 
of the “first notification” of the action that results in the taxation in 
violation of the CTA.126 
When a person brings such a case and the authority to which the 
person brought its case cannot resolve the issue, the tax authorities of the 
contracting jurisdictions are to seek mutual agreement in accordance with 
the CTA in resolving the issue.127 The tax authorities of the jurisdictions are 
also to endeavor to resolve difficulties or doubts in the interpretation or 
application of the CTA.128 This provision thus provides for the ability of 
persons to present grievances under the CTA and expresses the intent for 
the tax jurisdictions to resolve issues under the CTA in agreement with each 
other. 
Article 17 strives to address situations in which both contracting 
jurisdictions attempt to tax the same income from two different 
enterprises.129 This article envisions a scenario in which Jurisdiction A 
                                                                                                                                      
is under the control of the same persons or enterprises as the other, closely related person. 
Whether this part of the definition is met is based on a facts and circumstances test. 
Additionally, a person is closely related to another person where one of the persons directly 
or indirectly “possesses” more than 50% of the “beneficial interest” (both vote and value) in 
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 121 Id. at Art. 14(1). 
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includes in the (taxable) profits of a domestic enterprise, amounts that 
Jurisdiction B has attributed as (taxable) profits to an enterprise located in 
Jurisdiction B.130 In such cases, if the profits would have been attributable 
to the enterprise in Jurisdiction A had the “conditions” between the 
enterprises been those of independent enterprises, Jurisdiction B must 
adjust its tax on those profits.131 Such an adjustment should be made in 
accordance with the CTA, and the tax authorities of the jurisdictions are to 
consult with each other “if necessary.”132 This provision of the MLI thus 
provides procedures for tax jurisdictions to unilaterally address certain 
issues brought by taxpayers.133 
Part VI of the MLI also seeks to advance Action Fourteen of the BEPS 
Project.134 It does this by providing for binding arbitration of certain tax 
controversies brought within one of the contracting jurisdictions.135 Article 
19 of the MLI provides for arbitration when a party brings an action on a 
tax controversy under Article 16 of the MLI (the MAP), thus claiming that 
one or both of the jurisdictions is taxing it in violation of the applicable 
CTA.136 Specifically, where the tax authorities of the two contracting 
jurisdictions are unable to resolve the controversy within two years of one 
of several specified dates, any unresolved issues from the case are 
submitted to binding arbitration, if the party bringing the suit so desires.137 
The arbitration is then implemented by mutual agreement.138 
There are several situations in which the arbitration is not binding on 
the tax jurisdictions.139 The first situation is when “a person directly 
affected by the case” does not withdraw issues resolved via the arbitration 
from consideration within sixty days of the notification of mutual 
agreement following the arbitration process.140 The second situation is 
when a court within the territory of one of the contracting jurisdictions 
holds that the arbitration decision is invalid.141 A third situation is when “a 
person directly affected by the case” litigates on the issues that had already 
been resolved by the mutual agreement procedure which implemented the 
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arbitration decision..142 Under Article 22, should the tax authorities of the 
contracting jurisdictions reach an agreement to resolve the issues or the 
person who brought the case withdraws it prior to the delivery of the 
arbitration decision, the arbitration proceedings are terminated.143 Finally, 
under Article 24, if the contracting jurisdictions reach a different agreement 
on all the issues within three calendar months of the delivery of the 
arbitration decision, the arbitration decision is not binding.144 The 
remaining provisions of Part VI of the MLI establish procedures for 
selecting arbitrators, ensuring confidentiality through the arbitration 
process, determining the type of arbitration process, handling arbitration 
costs, and other procedural matters regarding arbitration of tax issues.145 
Part VI of the MLI thus generally, but not universally, subjects tax 
jurisdictions to binding arbitration on many issues under CTAs. 
Therefore, the MLI includes provisions that aim to address many of 
the BEPS Project’s concerns. Under Action Fifteen, the MLI includes 
provisions that seek to limit the effects of certain types of “hybrid mismatch 
agreements” by limiting the degree to which entities can obtain tax relief 
from both contracting jurisdictions simultaneously.146 It also includes 
numerous provisions to prevent “treaty abuse” by limiting the 
circumstances in which taxpayers can receive various treaty benefits, such 
as deductions related to dividends.147 The MLI also includes a variety of 
mechanisms to make it more difficult to avoid PE status through what the 
OECD considers to be artificial maneuvers.148 Finally, the MLI includes 
numerous provisions to facilitate the resolution of tax disputes under a 
CTA. Such provisions include the assurance that injured taxpayers will 
have a venue in which to seek relief,149 the assurance that the contracting 
jurisdictions will attempt to reach an agreement between each other on tax 
issues arising under the CTAs,150 and the assurance that binding arbitration 
is an option when the contracting jurisdictions cannot reach an agreement 
on CTA tax issues presented.151 Thus, the MLI provisions do attempt to 
address some of the BEPS Project’s concerns. 
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IV. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE MLI PROVISIONS 
Despite the efforts to resolve many of the BEPS Project’s concerns, 
the MLI itself ultimately does not provide final solutions to the BEPS 
Actions and will ultimately be largely ineffective at reducing BEPS. As the 
MLI itself indicates, it is “flexible.”152 While in some cases this means that 
the MLI provides multiple options for signing jurisdictions, in many cases, 
this provides tax jurisdictions with the opportunity to reject entire 
provisions of the MLI. The impact of a tax jurisdiction’s rejection of an 
MLI provision is magnified by the fact that where one of the parties to a 
CTA has made reservations against a provision of the MLI, the provision 
will not apply to that CTA.153 Although there are some mandatory 
provisions within the MLI, they are relatively few in number.154 
Accordingly, signing the MLI does not, in and of itself, mean that tax 
jurisdictions are committing to abide by all, or even most, of the MLI’s 
provisions. 
Indeed, many of the MLI’s strictest and otherwise most impactful 
provisions are either optional or can be opted out of by signing 
jurisdictions. The entirety of Part II of the MLI, addressing what the OECD 
calls “hybrid mismatches,” is optional for signing parties.155 Accordingly, 
the mere signing of the MLI does not necessarily bind a tax jurisdiction to 
classify transparent entity income as that of a resident, take measures to 
prevent double non-taxation, or to do anything to address Action Two of 
the BEPS Project.156 Indeed, of the seventy-eight tax jurisdictions that have 
signed the MLI as of the date of this writing, fifty-nine have indicated that 
they do not intend to apply Article 3 in its entirety, fifty-six have indicated 
that they do not intend to apply Article 4 in its entirety, and forty-three have 
indicated that they do not intend to apply one of the options in Article 5 to 
their CTAs.157 
The MLI provisions dealing with the prevention of treaty abuse 
require only slightly more action from signing jurisdictions. Specifically, all 
but Article 6, Article 7, and Article 9 within Part III of the MLI are 
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completely optional.158 Thus, the measures limiting the tax exemption of 
international dividends,159 the provisions limiting the ability of entities to 
avoid tax by conducting business through entities in third jurisdictions,160 
and the provisions limiting the exceptions to a tax jurisdiction’s ability to 
tax its own residents are entirely optional.161 
Even under the articles that carry mandatory requirements, the 
requirements are relatively minimal. Under Article 6, signing jurisdictions 
must only commit to including in their CTAs a preamble indicating their 
desire to eliminate double-taxation and double non-taxation.162 Article 7 
only mandates the application of the principal purpose test. Article 7 leaves 
the Simplified Limitation on Benefits Provision , which makes it more 
difficult for businesses to receive treaty benefits, optional.163 Article 9 also 
permits signing jurisdictions to refrain from applying paragraph (1), which 
provides for the taxing of gain on the alienation of interests an entity holds 
in another entity that derive a certain amount of their value from real 
property in another contracting jurisdiction.164 As of the date of this writing, 
forty-three of the signing jurisdictions have indicated that they do not 
intend to fully apply Article 8; at least forty-six have indicated that they do 
not intend to fully apply Article 9; fifty-seven have indicated that they do 
not intend to fully apply Article 10; and fifty-five have indicated that they 
do not intend to fully apply the provisions of Article 11 to their CTAs.165 
In addition, the entirety of Part IV of the MLI is optional for signing 
jurisdictions.166 These articles, which target the ability of businesses to 
avoid PE status through “artificial” tax maneuvers, are thus not inherently 
binding on signing jurisdictions.167 At the time of this writing, forty-three 
signing jurisdictions have expressed their intent not to apply the provisions 
of Article 12; thirty have expressed their intent to not apply the provisions 
of Article 13; fifty-seven have expressed their intent to not fully apply 
Article 14; and thirty-four have expressed their intent to not fully apply the 
Article 15 definitions to their CTAs.168 
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Additionally, many of the efforts to improve dispute resolution 
measures are optional. The entire provision for binding arbitration is 
optional,169 and only twenty-eight signing jurisdictions have indicated their 
intent to apply it to their CTAs.170 In general, the provisions of Part V of the 
MLI are required by signers of the MLI unless the CTA is covered by 
otherwise comparable dispute resolution measures.171 
Finally, the MLI provisions do not even seek to address many of the 
OECD’s primary concerns about BEPS. As the BEPS Project actions 
indicate, many of the primary opportunities for BEPS are really the result of 
domestic laws rather than provisions in treaties.172 Domestic law must 
address issues such as characterizing income to reflect what the OECD sees 
as economic reality, adjusting taxation of controlled foreign corporations 
(Action 3), and changing domestic law on transfer pricing (Action 13).173 
Although this issue is not unique to the particular text of the MLI, the need 
for domestic laws to change in order to comprehensively reduce BEPS 
severely limits the effectiveness of the MLI at reducing BEPS. Thus, there 
are relatively few binding obligations that signing the MLI inherently 
entails. Binding provisions include the requirement to express a desire to 
avoid double-taxation without providing opportunities for double non-
taxation, adopt the principal purpose test, and commit to trying to reach an 
agreement with the other contracting tax jurisdiction on certain tax disputes 
arising under a CTA.174 However, the enforcement of these commitments is 
largely left to the individual tax jurisdictions.175 The mere fact that a tax 
jurisdiction ratifies the MLI does not inherently mean that it has committed 
to taking significant substantive measures to reduce BEPS.176 Indeed, most 
of the optional articles of the MLI are not expected to be fully applied by 
                                                          
 169 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 18. 
 170 See Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty 
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 2. 
 171 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 16 – Art. 17. 
 172 Action Plan, supra note 3; see Michael V. Sala, Breaking Down BEPS: Strategies, 
Reforms, and Planning Responses, 47 CONN. L. REV. 573, 604 (2014). 
 173 Action Plan, supra note 3. 
 174 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 6, Art. 7, and Art. 16. 
 175 See id. 
 176 As of this writing, only four signing jurisdictions have ratified the MLI: Austria, the 
Isle of Man, Jersey, and Poland. However, three of these have expressed the intent to not 
fully apply most of the optional provisions of the MLI. The other seventy-four signing 
jurisdictions have merely expressed which provisions of the MLI they hope to ratify through 
their domestic ratification process. It is thus entirely possible that if/when tax jurisdictions 
ratify the MLI, they will reject more of the optional provisions than their representatives 
originally hoped to ratify. See Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention to 
Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra 
note 2. 
Why the MLI Will Have Limited Direct Impact 
39:225 (2019) 
245 
the majority of signing jurisdictions. 
V. WHY TAX JURISDICTIONS ARE UNLIKELY TO ABIDE BY 
THE MLI’S PROVISIONS 
As indicated above, even the tax jurisdictions that signed the MLI 
have generally not committed themselves to taking many substantive steps 
in order to reduce BEPS. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the MLI 
will not be effective in reducing BEPS. It is theoretically conceivable that 
tax jurisdictions would willingly implement policies recommended by the 
BEPS Project under the BEPS Actions, particularly those reflected in the 
MLI. However, the goals of the MLI and BEPS Project more generally 
often conflict with many of the policy interests that non-signing and signing 
jurisdictions may have. Accordingly, with its mostly optional and largely 
unenforceable provisions, the MLI is unlikely to be effective in reducing 
BEPS. 
In the first place, going beyond the bare linguistic requirements of the 
MLI to reduce BEPS in the treaty context requires tax jurisdictions to 
surrender a degree of their control over their taxing authority. Although 
Parts V and VI of the MLI provide means for tax jurisdictions to avoid 
submitting to or even reaching agreements on tax treaty provisions, the idea 
of these provisions is that tax jurisdictions will resolve international tax 
issues either by mutual agreement or arbitration.177 Such activity by a tax 
jurisdiction requires a tax jurisdiction to potentially change its taxing 
activities on the basis of another tax jurisdiction or the arbitrators, thus 
surrendering a measure of control over its own taxes. As taxes are the 
primary means by which the taxing entities raise revenue, tax jurisdictions 
tend to strongly avoid giving up control of them.178 
Furthermore, as the power to tax is not only the power to destroy, but 
also the power to regulate and incentivize private actors, tax jurisdictions 
have a strong incentive to retain as much control over their tax schemes as 
possible.179 Indeed, fear of losing this autonomy is thought to be a reason 
why some tax jurisdictions have refused to sign the MLI at all.180 In order to 
preserve control over their own ability to raise revenue, even signing 
jurisdictions are unlikely to go beyond the minimum amount required by 
the language of the MLI to which they adhere. 
Second, efforts to reduce BEPS beyond the strict language of the MLI 
require tax jurisdictions to be more transparent with the international 
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community as to both their tax schemes and the financial information of 
entities operating within their borders. In addition to providing a 
competitive advantage for attracting business activity,181 a lack of 
transparency as to tax information of those operating inside a tax 
jurisdiction’s borders can be seen as necessary for protecting the tax regime 
itself from external pressures.182 This desire for tax jurisdictions to avoid 
greater transparency will incentivize signing jurisdictions of the MLI to 
avoid going beyond the language of the MLI to prevent BEPS. 
Finally, the MLI and BEPS Project’s fundamental goal of increasing 
the effective tax rates on international enterprises conflicts with the interests 
of many tax jurisdictions, including those who have signed the MLI.183 As 
is commonly accepted, under a competitive tax regime, many tax 
jurisdictions seek to reduce the taxes they collect from entities that they 
desire to engage in activity within their borders.184 Clearly, these 
jurisdictions, such as Ireland, have a strong incentive to avoid more heavily 
taxing international entities operating in their borders.185 Furthermore, 
while the OECD has documented the extent to which it believes 
governments miss collecting tax revenues because of BEPS, the significant 
increase in global tax revenues over periods of decreasing nominal tax rates 
may lead some tax jurisdictions to refrain from combating BEPS in the 
interest of preserving tax revenue.186 Thus, in the interest of protecting their 
own tax revenue, tax jurisdictions may refrain from vigorously applying the 
standards of the MLI to reduce BEPS. 
It is also worth noting that several jurisdictions with a substantial 
impact on global business have not signed the MLI. Of these, the most 
influential is the United States.187 Because of its economic and political 
influence, the United States has historically dominated international tax 
policy and continues to have significant influence over the outcomes of 
international tax policies.188 Various facets of the United States’ federal 
government have expressed resistance to signing the MLI on the grounds 
that it disproportionately targets U.S. firms.189 Additionally, Brazil has not 
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signed the MLI, and has expressed a preference for engaging in bilateral 
changes to its existing tax treaties.190 As long as countries such as Brazil 
and the United States continue to resist signing the MLI at all, the MLI’s 
impact will be limited in reducing BEPS. 
Thus, the MLI will generally be ineffective at achieving BEPS 
objectives. While the BEPS Project seeks to prevent entities from using 
“artificial” maneuvers to minimize global taxation, the provisions of the 
MLI that confront those maneuvers are generally optional or fail to 
comprehensively address the BEPS objectives. Indeed, many of the BEPS 
objectives are beyond the scope of the MLI. Furthermore, even the 
jurisdictions that have signed the MLI have little incentive to take action 
beyond the letter of the MLI to prevent BEPS. Accordingly, “mock 
compliance” with the MLI is likely from many of the signing 
jurisdictions.191 This means that the MLI, although it expresses an 
international desire to address BEPS, ultimately is not likely to effectively 
reduce BEPS. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The MLI is the product of several years of work by the OECD to 
develop measures to reduce BEPS. It attempts to apply several of the action 
items that the OECD has identified as being particularly important in 
reducing BEPS. However, the impact of this document will likely be 
constrained by the selective, optional nature of many of its provisions, 
which do not require signing jurisdictions to commit themselves to taking 
significant measures to reduce BEPS. Indeed, some of the most influential 
tax jurisdictions have refused to even sign the MLI. Furthermore, those 
jurisdictions which have signed the MLI are often incentivized to apply its 
provisions sparingly. Thus, while it likely reflects many increasingly 
accepted principles of international taxation, the MLI is likely to have a 
limited impact on global taxation. 
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